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Taxes and Benefits: 
Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?
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While there is an extensive literature on tax evasion a further aspect of cheating on the state, 
namely benefit fraud, has gained relatively modest attention in the economic literature. This 
paper seeks to fill this gap. We explore differences between benefit fraud and tax evasion 
due to differing social norms. We define the concepts of benefit morale and tax morale as the 
motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via these two offenses. Our multilevel 
analysis, based on a large micro data set of respondents from 29 OECD member countries, 
shows that benefit morale and tax morale have different determinants at an individual-level 
and respond differently to fiscal policy measures. 
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Economists have studied many facets of tax evasion. However, a diﬀerent aspect of cheating
on the state, namely beneﬁt fraud, has gained relatively modest attention in the literature.
This fact is surprising since there is a widespread concern about abuse and dishonesty in social
welfare and health care programmes.1 The relatively low levels of interest in beneﬁt fraud by
economic scholars may be caused by the fact that, from a theoretical point of view, beneﬁt
fraud may appear identical to tax evasion. In reality, the incidence and extent of these two
oﬀenses may diﬀer substantially. Firstly, the behavioral determinants of the classical economics-
of-crime approach (Becker, 1968), i.e. the probability of detection and level of ﬁne rate, may
vary. Secondly, and more importantly, citizens may consider one oﬀense to be more severe than
the other. We provide empirical evidence that these social norms evolve endogenously, and that
beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion can be ascribed to diﬀerent economic factors.
Among economic scholars, it is widely accepted that individual behavior is the result of economic
incentives and social norms.2 Moreover, it is often argued that economic factors shape social
norms (Frey, 1997; Lindbeck, 1997; Bowles, 1998). The idea that social norms are aﬀected by
varying price and income has insightful implications. For instance, a social norm such as tax
morale may increase or decrease with income (Shleifer, 2004). In general, the feedback from
economic and political decisions to preferences and behavior has to be considered.
Naturally, social norms play a major role in certain decisions that individuals make, while in other
decisions economic incentives seem to be the driving force. Reviewing the economic literature on
tax evasion reveals that accounting for social norms is important to better understand individuals’
decision to evade (or not to evade) taxes. Recently, the quantitative prediction of the traditional
model of tax evasion has been heavily criticized. To align the predicted degree of tax evasion
with empirical and experimental evidence, taxpayers have to be assumed to be risk averse to an
absurd degree.3 In fact, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998, p.855) conclude that ‘more work
needs to be done exploring the diverse psychological, moral and social inﬂuences on compliance
1The most prominent anti-fraud measure is the US False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA dating back to 1863 is
intended to encourage citizens to come forward with information and assist authorities in uncovering any kind of
fraud against government, with the exception of tax evasion.
2In the following we use social norm and morale (motivation) synonymously. For a general discussion of social
norms, see Elster (1989).
3Realistic audit probabilities are very low, ranging from 0.01 to 0.03. Actual observed penalty rates are between
1.5 and 2. Given these parameter values, one has to assume a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of about 70 in
order to get realistic estimates of tax evasion predicted by the theoretical models. Realistic magnitudes of relative
risk aversion lie between 1 and 2 (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992).
2behavior, and integrating these factors into economic models’. There is indeed evidence from
experimental (Alm, Sanchez and De Juan, 1995; Torgler, 2002) and empirical studies (Torgler,
2005; Alm and Torgler, 2006; Frey and Torgler, 2007) that citizens are not motivated purely by
the rate of return on tax evasion but also by moral aspects. Therefore, social norms are closely
linked to the famous question ‘Why do people pay taxes?’ (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992).
We think that social norms are equally important in understanding the sparsely researched issue
of beneﬁt fraud, which endangers the functioning of the welfare state (Lindbeck, 1995, 1997;
Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 1999). We deﬁne the concept of beneﬁt morale and tax morale
as the moral motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion,
respectively. Given that beneﬁt morale (tax morale) is a determinant of actual beneﬁt fraud (tax
evasion), we identify (based on large-scale survey data) factors which shape this social norm in
society.
Building on standard consumer theory, we focus on economic factors such as income and prices.
The price of behaving honestly is aﬀected by individual-level characteristics (e.g. opportunity
cost) and country-level variables, such as ﬁscal policy measures. Our testable hypotheses draw
on factors measured on both levels. Employing a large micro data set from the European and
World Values Survey, combined with information from the OECD Database we show that the two
moral motivations are indeed aﬀected by economic factors. We observe important diﬀerences.
For instance, beneﬁt morale improves with rising income while tax morale deteriorates with rising
income. Fiscal policy measures have equivalent qualitative eﬀects, however, diﬀerent quantitative
importance. Our results are robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and methods applied.
We believe that our ﬁndings add to the literature in three substantive and one methodological
dimension. First and foremost, this is the ﬁrst study showing that tax evasion and beneﬁt
fraud are two distinct issues. Secondly, we add to the literature on the endogeneity of social
norms. Thirdly, by evaluating the relationship between ﬁscal policy and compliance measures,
we add to the literature on tax morale. Finally, by estimating a multilevel (or hierarchical)
model, that explicitly models the two-level data structure (individual and country), we provide
a methodological improvement. Up to now, economists studying the eﬀects of state polices and
institutions on individual outcomes (such as tax morale) have typically used averaged data, or
accounted for the presence of clustered data by calculating robust standard errors. However,
neither approach is satisfactory and may bias the results.4 On top of that, the framework of
4The use of average data wipes out heterogeneity at an individual level and presupposes the assumption of
3multilevel analysis will allow us to incorporate heterogenous policy eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section2 we discuss the small body of related literature.
In Section3 we deﬁne our concept of beneﬁt and tax morale and derive testable hypotheses.
Section4 and 5 describe the dependent and independent variables, respectively. Our empirical
strategy is outlined in Section6. The estimation results are presented in Section7, and Section8
reports on our robustness checks. Finally, in Section9 we conclude the paper. The Data appendix
provides all details on data sources and deﬁnitions.
2 Related literature
There are at least two important strands of literature, namely papers on tax evasion and papers
on beneﬁt fraud. As indicated in the introduction, the literature on tax evasion is extensive, and
a review is not within the scope of this paper.5 In contrast, the literature on beneﬁt fraud is
very scarce. Within the theoretical literature the analysis of beneﬁt fraud is restricted to the
fraudulent receipt of unemployment beneﬁts. Yaniv (1986) and Burgess (1992) model the abuse
of unemployment insurance (e.g. recipients who work or avoid job-search activities). Various
penalty schemes and optimal deterrence policies are discussed. Lantto (1989) models the abuse
of social insurance by capable working claimants.
The labor economics literature contains some empirical studies on income underreporting in
transfer programs in the US. These studies typically examine fraud in programs that are similar
to a negative-income tax plan. They ﬁnd substantial income underreporting for up to 50 per-
cent of certain subgroups of the population (Greenberg, Moﬃtt and Friedman, 1981; Greenberg
and Halsey, 1982). Similarly Wolf and Greenberg (1986b) identify frequent overpayments in
unemployment insurance systems, indicating that many claimants falsely certify that they have
actively sought a job. Studies analyzing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Food Stamps entitlement programs ﬁnd only modest fraud rates of 2 to 4 percent (Wolf and
Greenberg, 1986a).
Heinemann (2008) is a rare exception of a study on the determinants of beneﬁt morale. He
homogenous policy eﬀects. Moreover, it substantially reduces the degrees of freedom and requires cardinality of
satisfaction scores. Calculating robust standard errors to account for a multilevel data structure is a much weaker
form of correction than estimating a multilevel model and will result in diﬀerent point estimates.
5The development of the literature through the 1980s is surveyed by Cowell (1990). More recent literature
surveys are provided by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). For a review
on the literature on the underground economy, which exists in part as a means of tax evasion, see Schneider and
Enste (2000).
4provides evidence that in the long-run an increase of government beneﬁts and unemployment
is associated with deteriorating beneﬁt morale. Another strand of the literature discusses the
phenomenon of welfare stigma. This describes a situation where citizens do not participate in a
(social) welfare program although they are eligible to receive beneﬁts (Moﬃtt, 1983; Besley and
Coate, 1992). Yaniv (1997) argues that welfare fraud and welfare stigma may be modeled with
one single aparatus.
In this paper we focus on the diﬀerences between beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion due to diﬀering
social norms. In the next section we deﬁne the concepts of beneﬁt morale and tax morale. To
derive testable hypotheses on the determinants of beneﬁt and tax morale we build on standard
consumer theory. The compliance with beneﬁt and tax law is regarded as a moral consumption
good whose demand is determined by price and income. The price of behaving honestly is aﬀected
by individual-level characteristics and country-level variables such as ﬁscal policy measures.
3 Beneﬁt and tax morale
We deﬁne beneﬁt morale and tax morale as the moral motivation to abstain from cheating on
the state via beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion, respectively. Empirically we capture these morale
motivations based on survey data. Theoretically we think of beneﬁt morale and tax morale
as moral goods.6 Citizens who fully comply with the beneﬁt law (tax code) consume a high
level of beneﬁt morale (tax morale). Considering a standard utility formulation, the demand is
determined by price and income. Consequently, we expect diﬀerent economic factors to aﬀect
the demand for beneﬁt morale and tax morale.
A priori it is not clear whether beneﬁt morale and tax morale are normal or inferior goods.
Put diﬀerently, beneﬁt morale or tax morale could either increase or decrease in response to an
exogenous wealth shock. Likewise, it is hard to test this empirically. A change in income entails
not only a wealth eﬀect, but also a price eﬀect. The latter eﬀect occurs since the opportunity
cost (i.e. the price) to behave honestly vary with income. Of course, a changing price itself
also contains two eﬀect, a substitution eﬀect and a wealth eﬀect. Fortunately, our data allows
us to disentangle these eﬀects; the sum of the wealth eﬀects versus the substitution eﬀect. We
can examine a variation in wealth while controlling for income. That means, we can observe a
wealth shock while keeping the substitution eﬀect constant. We ﬁnd strong evidence (discussed
6For a discussion of moral goods in the context of cognitive dissonance theory, see Östling (2007).
5below) that both goods are normal (positive wealth eﬀect). This corresponds with the idea that
wealth provides greater opportunity to behave morally (Shleifer, 2004). We therefore presume
subsequently that both moral goods are normal goods.
To test the hypothesis that the demand for beneﬁt and tax morale is aﬀected by their prices
we exploit in a ﬁrst step that prices vary among subgroups of the population. In particular, we
argue that labor market status provides a particularly useful and clear division. Citizens out
of the labor force face a tax morale price of zero. By deﬁnition they earn no labor income and
consuming a high level of tax morale (i.e. full compliance with the income tax) does not aﬀect
purchasing power. In contrast, an employed citizen incurs costs by consuming tax morale. S/he
faces a price strictly larger than zero. Consequently, citizens out of the labor force will (compared
to the employed) demand a higher quantity of tax morale, and we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Citizens out of the labor force demand more tax morale compared to
employed ones
In the case of beneﬁt morale both groups pay a strictly positive price. By consuming an additional
unit of beneﬁt morale they clearly forgo consumption of other goods. However, it is reasonable
that employed citizens face a lower price than their counterparts who are out of the labor force.
For instance, being out of the labor force implies in many cases eligibility status for many types of
beneﬁts, such as housing subsidy. Given that one is eligible, the temptation to claim unjustiﬁed
higher beneﬁts may be higher (and the costs lower) than if one were not eligible in a ﬁrst place.
Therefore, we suppose that citizens out of the labor force will demand a lower quantity of beneﬁt
morale compared to employed citizens:
Hypothesis 1b: Citizens out of the labor force demand less beneﬁt morale compared
to employed ones
What about income? As stated above a changing income entails a wealth eﬀect and a substitution
eﬀect due to changing opportunity cost. Based on our empirical test we presume that both goods
are normal goods (positive wealth eﬀect). The substitution eﬀect is as usually negative (i.e.
demand decreases in its own price). The price of beneﬁt morale arguably decreases with income.
For instance, a high-income household has few opportunities to commit beneﬁt fraud. Moreover,
such a household faces a higher probability of being caught for beneﬁt fraud compared to a
household at the bottom of the income distribution. The rich household will typically pretend
6eligibility ﬁrst, while the eligible low-income household simply claims higher beneﬁts. Further,
the rich household could expect a higher ﬁne if convicted. In other words, for high-income
households beneﬁt fraud is comparably less proﬁtable, thus they face relatively lower cost of
beneﬁt morale. The prediction on the overall eﬀect of income on beneﬁt morale is therefore
unambiguous (wealth and substitution eﬀect go in the same direction) and we hypothesize that
the price of beneﬁt morale decreases with income:
Hypothesis 2a: Beneﬁt morale increases with income
By equivalent reasoning, one can deduce that low-income households face low cost of tax morale.
Therefore, the price of tax morale increases with income and the wealth and the substitution
eﬀect counteract. If the wealth (substitution) eﬀect dominates we expect tax morale to increase
(decrease) with income.
Hypothesis 2b (null): The substitution eﬀect dominates the wealth eﬀect and tax
morale decreases with income
Hypothesis 2b (alternative): The wealth eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect and
tax morale increases with income
There is a wide range of policy measures that may aﬀect the price of beneﬁt and tax morale. In
this paper we focus on two ﬁscal policy measures, the tax burden and public social expenditures.
Both variables are emphasized in the tax evasion literature and are available on an internationally
comparable level. For both cases, we derive a hypothesis on their eﬀect on tax and beneﬁt morale.
Tax burden – Most of the theoretical models of tax evasion fail to provide a clear prediction
regarding the eﬀect of a changing tax rate on evasion. The presence of both income and sub-
stitution eﬀects complicates the analysis. Theoretical predictions of the impact of tax rates on
evasion are dependent on modeling assumptions.7 The majority of empirical (e.g. Clotfelter,
1983; Crane and Nourzad, 1986) an experimental analyses (e.g. Friedland, Maital and Ruten-
berg, 1978; Baldry, 1987; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992), however, report a positive relation
between tax rates and tax evasion. This result is in line with common intuition. With respect
to tax morale we have a clear prediction. Since a rising tax rate increases the cost of (full) com-
pliance, it is equivalent to an increase in the price of tax morale. In addition, there is a wealth
7For instance, in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the relationship between tax rates and
evasion is ambiguous, and depends on speciﬁc assumptions on the shape of risk aversion.
7eﬀect in the same direction. Therefore, we expect a lower demand for tax morale in response to
increasing tax rates:
Hypothesis 3a: Higher tax rates lower tax morale
On contrary, a changing tax rate does not alter the price of beneﬁt morale per se. Based on this
line of reasoning we expect that the tax burden has no eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. However, the
wealth eﬀect is expected to lower beneﬁt morale:
Hypothesis 3b: Higher tax rates lower beneﬁt morale
Public social expenditures – It is often argued that not the actual tax burden but the perceived
tax burden is decisive. The perception of the individual tax burden depends both on the amount
of taxes paid and on the individual beneﬁts derived from public expenditures. In other words,
a tax payment can be considered as an individual’s contribution to a public good. Based on
this idea of ﬁscal exchange (Buchanan, 1976), the nature of public expenditures may inﬂuence
tax evasion. Willingness to pay taxes should increase with the level of utility that government
services and goods provide. This is supported by empirical (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann,
1996; Frey, 1997) and experimental (Alm and Jackson, 1993; Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1999;
Feld and Tyran, 2002) evidence showing that compliance is higher if tax revenues are spent on
programs tax payers approve and if they actively participate in the decision process.8 In general,
it is diﬃcult to distinguish which sub-population of citizens will beneﬁt from a certain public
good or service. However, we think that a well-functioning welfare state is generally perceived as
a desirable public good. Therefore, we study the eﬀect of public social spending on compliance
through the following hypothesis.9
Hypothesis 4: Higher public social expenditures improve tax morale
A priori, it is not clear whether beneﬁt morale is inﬂuenced by the perceived tax burden and we
have to leave it is subject to an empirical veriﬁcation.
Public social expenditures are a type of public good where the individual utility derived varies
with income. Citizens at the top of the income distribution will typically beneﬁt less from a
8Bordignon (1993) provides a theoretical model with a predicted eﬀect of public expenditures that is in line
with empirical end experimental evidence.
9Public social expenditures are also quantitatively important. They account for the largest percentage of total
public expenditures among OECD-member countries.
8well-functioning welfare state. As a consequence, we expect that the positive impact of higher
public spending on tax morale decreases as we move up the income distribution. To test this,
we extend our multilevel model and include cross level interactions to explore so-called causal
heterogeneity (Western, 1998):
Hypothesis 4a: The positive eﬀect of higher public social expenditures on tax morale
decreases with income
4 Dependent variables
We observe data from the ﬁrst four waves of the European and World Values Survey (E/WVS).10
This survey contains information on basic attitudes, beliefs and human values covering religion,
morality, politics, work and leisure. In particular respondents are asked to evaluate on a ten-point
scale whether they think ‘claiming state beneﬁts which you are not entitled to can always be
justiﬁed, never be justiﬁed, or something in between’. The same question was asked for ‘cheating
on tax if [they] have the chance’ [...]. We use these two questions to construct our measure of
beneﬁt morale and tax morale. Information about more than 75,000 respondents from 29 OECD
member countries from 1982 to 2001 is available.11 An overview of the number of observations
over years and countries is given in Table1.
Overall, citizens show a slightly higher level of beneﬁt morale (8.84) than of tax morale (8.48).
Figures1 and 2 show the average level of beneﬁt morale and tax morale by countries. Most of
the large economies, such as the United States, Great Britain and Japan, show values above the
OECD average in both cases. Turkey, with means of 9.77 and 9.83, exhibits the highest level of
both beneﬁt morale and tax morale in the OECD area. Other top ten countries in both categories
are Denmark, Czech Republic and Iceland. In contrast, Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg are
at the bottom of the list in both rankings. Citizens in Greece have the lowest level of beneﬁt
morale (7.03), and Belgians perform worst in tax morale (7.18).
The Spearman’s rank correlation between beneﬁt morale and tax morale (based on individual
data) is 0.44 and indicates that the issues are closely connected (see also the scatter-plot in
Figure3). Nevertheless, we obtain systematic diﬀerences on a country-level. Whereas the average
10Wave 1 was carried out between 1981 and 1984, Wave 2 between 1989 and 1993, Wave 3 between 1994 and
1999 and Wave 4 between 1999 and 2004.
11The Republic of Korea is the only OECD-member country we do not have any information for.
9level of beneﬁt morale is above that of tax morale in the majority of the countries we obtain
six countries (Greece, Mexico, Japan, France, Slovakia and Turkey) where the reverse is true
(see Figure4). The largest diﬀerences in average levels (in absolute terms) can be observed in
Norway (1.52), the Netherlands (1.43) and Belgium (1.41).
For the majority of the countries we can observe the development of beneﬁt morale and tax
morale cover time. Figure5 depicts the evolution of average beneﬁt morale for countries with
four and three available observations separately. An equivalent depiction for tax morale is given
by Figure6.12 In most of the countries beneﬁt morale and tax morale are fairly stable over time.
The average range of ﬂuctuation (i.e. the diﬀerence between the within country maximum and
minimum) in beneﬁt morale for the depicted countries is 0.47. The largest ﬂuctuation (minus
1.11) is observed for Slovakia between the second wave (1991) and the third wave (1998). This
time span includes the transition of Slovakia as a part of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to a
separate sovereign state in 1993. The average range of ﬂuctuation in tax morale across countries
is somewhat higher (0.57). Mexico accounts for the largest ﬂuctuation range of 1.36 between the
second wave (1990) and the fourth wave (2000). In our empirical analysis we will account for
the diﬀerences across countries and across time.
Altogether, the descriptive statistics indicate that citizens conceive beneﬁt fraud and tax evasion
as related but not equal oﬀenses.
5 Independent variables
In order to test our hypotheses we use information on individuals’ labor market status, income,
the tax burden and on public social expenditures. Moreover, we need a reasonable set of control
variables. The E/WVS provides a wide range of socio-economic characteristics measured on
an individual level. It contains information on labor market status (employed, self-employed,
unemployed or out of the labor force) and on household income (measured on a ten-point scale).
This allows us to test Hypothesis 1 and 2.
The survey does not provide information on individuals’ tax burden or a measure for the utility
derived from public social expenditures. We therefore have to rely on average tax rates and public
expenditures measured on a country level in order to test Hypothesis 3 and 4. To measure the
12For the remaining 13 countries we have only two or one observations in time. Mexico and Slovakia are
suppressed in Figure5 and Figure6, respectively.
10tax burden we calculate eﬀective average tax rates, which are based on a methodology inspired
by Lucas (1990), developed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and reﬁned by Volkerink and
de Haan (2001). This is a well-known approach to measure the tax burden on labor, capital and
consumption on an internationally comparable level (OECD, 2000). It is based on aggregate data
drawn from Revenue Statistics and National Accounts (see Table 2). In order to test Hypothesis
4 we opt for public social expenditure derived from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. See
the Data appendix for details.
On an individual level we control for further socio-economic characteristics such as age, sex,
marital status, number of children, education (captured by school leaving age) and size of place of
residence (measured on a three-point scale). The set of country-level control variables comprises
population information (size of the population and fertility rates) as well as macroeconomic
indicators (GDP per capita, inﬂation and unemployment rates).
6 Multilevel model
Citizens in our data are clustered in countries in which they share a speciﬁc mix of ﬁscal policy,
political institutions, and macroeconomic conditions. Since we observe beneﬁt and tax morale
on an individual level and ﬁscal policy on a country-level, we exploit information on both levels
to explain determinants of the moral motivation to comply.
This data structure is in fact very common. Whenever researchers are interested in the eﬀects of
state polices and institutions on individual outcomes (such as subjective measures) the presence
of such multilevel data poses a challenge to statistical analysis. Economists typically meet this
challenge by calculating Huber-White (also called Sandwich or robust) standard errors or by using
averaged data. However, neither approach is satisfactory, and the more appropriate technique
of multilevel modelling – heavily used in other disciplines – is easily available.13
Multilevel models do not only account for intraclass correlation, but explicitly model the associ-
ation between individuals in the same cluster (country). It is a much stronger form of correction
than simply calculating robust standard errors. In contrast to the method of correcting stan-
dard errors, a multilevel analysis corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for the number of
13The terms hierarchical model, mixed-eﬀect model and mixed model are often used as synonyms for multilevel
models. This class of models has a long tradition in educational science and bio-statistics. Steenbergen and Jones
(2002) give an excellent overview and illustrate why such models are valuable for empirical research in economics
and political science. Rice and Jones (1997) present an introductory account of multilevel models and describe
how health economics research may beneﬁt from their use.
11clusters and will therefore give diﬀerent point estimates (UCLA: Academic Technology Services,
2008).
In particular, we consider a random intercept model, which is the simplest multi-level model to
account for the dependence among individuals nested in countries:
moraleij = β1 + β2xij + ζ1j + εij
= (β1 + ζ1j) + β2xij + εij,
(1)
where ζ1j ∼ (0,ψ) and εij ∼ (0,θ), the permanent error component ζ1j varies only between
countries j, and the transitory error component εij varies over citizens i and countries j. The
sum of these two terms, ξij = ζ1j + εij, is the total residual. The random intercept model can
be viewed as a model with a country-speciﬁc intercept β1 + ζ1j, where ζ1j is called a ‘random








This within-country correlation measures the ‘closeness’ of citizens from the same country relative
to the closeness of individuals from diﬀerent countries. It is straightforward to include country-
level covariates, such as wj:
moraleij = β1 + β2xij + β3wj + ζ1j + εij
= (β1 + ζ1j) + β2xij + β3wj + εij,
(3)
Apart from methodological reasons there are also good substantive reasons to use multilevel
analysis in our case. Most notably, it allows to explore causal heterogeneity (Western, 1998). We
will specify cross-level interactions, and check whether the eﬀect of certain ﬁscal policy measures
on moral motivation to comply varies across the income distribution.14
14Our two dependent variables are measured on a ten-point scale. Strictly speaking these are ordinal measures.
Therefore, we have also estimated a multilevel proportional-odds model (to be discussed in detail below). Since
the qualitative results are equivalent and the scale is rather large we will for the ease of presentation focus on the
conventional multilevel model throughout the paper. As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003); Norton, Wang
and Ai (2004) the interpretation of interaction eﬀects in nonlinear models is quite cumbersome and not fully
demonstrative.
127 Estimation results
Before we proceed to the estimation results of the main hypotheses, we report an auxiliary
empirical test to determine whether beneﬁt and tax morale are normal or inferior goods. The
E/WVS includes, in addition to the income, information on family savings which serves as our
measure of wealth. Survey respondents are asked ‘During the past year, did your family save
money, just get by, spent some savings, or spent savings and borrowed money’. Based on this
question we generate a four-point scale variable to capture wealth-shocks during the last year.
Subsequently we observe the impact of these wealth shocks on beneﬁt and tax morale while
controlling for income. As our results in Table3 show, in both cases beneﬁt morale and tax
morale improve in response to a positive wealth shock. Therefore, we conclude that both moral
goods are normal goods. Unfortunately, the information on wealth shocks is only available
for a sub-sample (12 countries with 18,344 observations). We infer from this sub-sample that
normality of beneﬁt and tax morale is generally given and exclude the wealth shock variable in
our analysis below in order to exploit the information on the full sample. This is taken into
account when we interpret the results of income.
Our main estimation results are summarized in Table4.15 We ﬁnd clear evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 1a and 1b. Compared to employed citizens, those out of the labor force have a
statistically signiﬁcant lower level of beneﬁt morale (minus 0.05 points). For tax morale the
reverse is true where citizens out of the labor force exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher willingness to
comply (plus 0.05 points). In both cases demand decreases with price, and we interpret this
as ﬁrst evidence that moral motivation to comply is an endogenous dimension.16 Notably, the
results are robust across all diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Let us turn to Hypotheses 2a and 2b on the eﬀect of income. Under the presumption that moral
goods are normal goods, the prediction on the eﬀect of income on beneﬁt morale is unambiguous.
Wealth and substitution operate in the same direction, and we expect beneﬁt morale to increase
with income. As predicted, our estimation shows that a one point higher income (measured on
a ten-point scale) is associated with an improvement of beneﬁt morale of about 0.03 points. In
the case of tax morale the wealth and the substitution eﬀect have opposite signs. Our estimation
15The intraclass correlation ρ varies in our eight models from 0.063 to 0.246; the mean is equal to 0.130. That
means, that on average 13 percent of variation can be explained by country-factors. This substantial intraclass
correlation indicates high clustering of morale in countries and, therefore, a strong country inﬂuence on individual
morale.
16With respect to the quantitative eﬀect one has to keep in mind that the sample mean is in both cases rather
high (8.84 and 8.48).
13results suggest that the substitution eﬀect dominates. This is evidence in favor of Hypotheses
2a (null). A one point increase in income reduces tax morale by 0.02 points. The comparably
smaller eﬀect in the case of tax morale (compared to beneﬁt morale) corroborates the result on
the normality of both goods. Again, this is clear evidence that moral motivation is determined by
prices. In other words, citizens rationalize their own deviant behavior. High-income households
have comparably more opportunities to commit tax evasion, probably exploit them and conse-
quently develop and report the attitude that cheating on taxes is more or less justiﬁable. Since
endeavors to fraudulently collect beneﬁts may be too risky, they abstain and develop/report the
attitude that claiming state beneﬁts to which one is not entitled, is a serious oﬀense. The same
reasoning – but vice versa – applies to low-income households.
In Table4 (speciﬁcation II) we consider the eﬀects of taxation (Hypothesis 3). With respect to
tax morale we have a clear prediction. An increase in the tax rate is equivalent to an increase
in the price of tax morale. Since the wealth eﬀect is in the same direction, tax morale should
decrease with an increasing tax burden. The strongest result is with respect to the taxation of
labor. As expected, higher taxes on labor reduce tax morale. A one percentage point increase
in the tax rate on labor (sample means is equal to 32 percent) decreases tax morale by 0.07
points, see Speciﬁcation II. For the consumption tax we also ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on tax morale,
however, this is statistically signiﬁcant only in Speciﬁcation II and III. The tax rate on capital
exerts no robust statistically signiﬁcant impact. This may be explained by the fact that the
taxation of capital is typically more complicated, and the average citizen may not be aware, or
can not accurately assess the implicit tax rate on capital.
With respect to the eﬀect of tax rates on beneﬁt morale, we have an equivalent prediction, but
based on the wealth eﬀect only. Our empirical results show that citizens respond in a similar
manner as with tax morale. Higher taxes on labor and consumption decrease beneﬁt morale.
Reasonably, we observe a smaller quantitative eﬀect of taxation of labor for beneﬁt morale than
for tax morale. This may indicate the sole impact of the wealth eﬀect. Interestingly, The eﬀect of
the consumption tax is more robust. We interpret thes results as evidence in favor of Hypothesis
3. If the tax burden is perceived to be, high citizens adjust their moral motivation to comply
and seem to view both tax evasion and beneﬁt fraud as tools to restore purchasing power. This
has important policy implications. For instance, increasing the tax rate as a strategy to increase
tax revenues can be counterproductive in that citizens might respond with low compliance. Tax
revenues may decrease by less than the amount hoped for and increased (unjustiﬁed) beneﬁt
14claims might aggravate the budget crisis.
In speciﬁcation II we introduce the level of aggregate public social spending (Hypothesis 4a) as
an additional explanatory variable. We show that tax morale, on average, improves with higher
aggregate public social spending. An increase in public social spending by one percentage point
(sample mean is equal to 19.44 percent) is associated with an increase in tax morale by 0.02
points. This result supports Hypothesis 4a and rejects the classical supposition that taxpayers
perceive their relationship with the state only as one of coercion. Citizens seem to recognize the
important role of exchange; they forgo private purchasing power in return for publicly provided
goods, such as a social welfare state. With respect to beneﬁt morale we do not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect, however, we will explore this issue in more detail below.
Citizens at the top of the income distribution will, in expectation, beneﬁt less from a well-
functioning welfare state. Therefore, we expect that the positive impact of higher public spending
on tax morale will decrease as we move up the income distribution (Hypothesis 4b). To test
this, we extend our multilevel model and include cross-level interactions (Western, 1998) in
speciﬁcation III. To operationalize causal heterogeneity with respect to public social spending,
we interact our measure of individual income with the share of GDP spent on social issues. The
central hypothesis here is that the positive eﬀect of higher public spending should decrease in
absolute terms with income. Econometrically, we expect a negative sign for the interaction term.
Speciﬁcation III indeed reveals that an increase in public social expenditure of one percent of
GDP increases citizens’ tax morale at the bottom of income distribution by about 0.04 points
(see Figure7). When we move up the income distribution, citizens beneﬁt less and accordingly
the eﬀect decreases. For citizens in the highest income group an equivalent increase of public
social expenditure has practically no eﬀect on their tax morale (see Figure7). In contrast, with
respect to beneﬁt morale there is no eﬀect of higher public spending discernable along the whole
income distribution – the eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero.
In a ﬁnal step we deepen the analysis in speciﬁcation IV where we include the composition of
public social expenditures in the estimation. We follow the OECD terminology of social purpose
and distinguish between nine policy areas: old age, survivors, incapacity-related beneﬁts, health,
family, active labor market policies, unemployment, housing and other social policy areas.17 The
quantitatively most important functional categories are old age (32.9 percent of total spending),
health (29.4 percent) and incapacity-related beneﬁts (11.1 percent).
17For details please refer to the Data appendix.
15The qualitative results hardly change when we control for the composition of expenditure, with
the exception of the eﬀect of an increase in public social spending on beneﬁt morale along the
income distribution (see Figure7). We now observe a statistically signiﬁcant pattern similar to
that of tax morale. In addition speciﬁcation IV reveals that citizens on average dislike spending
on the category old age (the base group). An increase in spending on all other groups (survivor,
incapacity, health family, ALMP and on the residual category) at the expense of old age improves
the average citizen’s beneﬁt and tax morale. A focus on housing improves tax morale, but
exerts no eﬀect on beneﬁt morale. The only category which is less popular than old age is
unemployment. Shifting resources from old age to unemployment related expenditures worsens
citizens’ beneﬁt morale.
The results on the individual-level control variables are robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
All the results concerning tax morale are in accordance with earlier studies (e.g. Torgler and
Schaltegger, 2006). Moreover, they are supported by empirical (Clotfelter, 1983; Dubin and
Wilde, 1988; Feinstein, 1991) and experimental (Friedland, Maital and Rutenberg, 1978; Spicer
and Becker, 1980; Spicer and Hero, 1985; Baldry, 1987) studies on tax evasion. We ﬁnd some
revealing diﬀerences between beneﬁt and tax morale. It turns out that some control variables
equivalently inﬂuence both variables, while another group exerts a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on only one outcome.
For instance, both outcomes rise with age. The estimated quantitative eﬀect suggests that an
additional year of age increases both levels of morale by about 0.02 points.18 Females tend to have
both a higher level of beneﬁt morale and of tax morale. In both cases the eﬀect is quantitatively
important too, with a higher eﬀect of tax morale (plus 0.32) as compared to beneﬁt morale (plus
0.21).19 Marital status is decisive too. Being married is associated with both a higher level of
beneﬁt morale (plus 0.26) and tax morale (0.18). The honest behavior of married people can
either be explained by a true causal eﬀect of marital status or by self-selection into marriage.
The size of the place of residence has also similar eﬀects on both outcomes: The bigger the place
18It is often argued that older people are expected to be more honest than younger ones since they have
acquired more social capital (Tittle, 1980) and they are often more attached to their community, which may
impose higher social costs of sanction (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996). The criminological literature
typically describes an age-crime curve which is characterized by an increase throughout the adolescent years,
reaching a maximum in late adolescence or early adulthood and a steady decline thereafter (e.g. Hirschi and
Gottfredson, 1983; Tittle and Ward, 1993; Tittle and Grasmick, 1997). In order to allow for such a functional
form we have included the variable age-squared. However, it turned out to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
19In general males show higher probabilities and frequencies of committing criminal acts than females (e.g.
Smith and Visher, 1980; Steﬀensmeier, Anderson and Streifel, 1989; Elliot, 1994).
16of residence the lower is the level of beneﬁt and tax morale.20
The level of education exerts a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on beneﬁt morale but not on tax
morale. An additional year of schooling increases the level of beneﬁt morale by about 0.01 points.
Self-employed citizens exhibit a substantially lower level of tax morale compared to employees
(minus 0.24 points). This can be explained by extensive opportunities to evade taxes (i.e. high
cost of tax morale) among the self-employed. This result mirrors Feinstein (1991) who analyzed
tax audit data and found that self-employed citizens were more likely to evade than the average
taxpayer.21 The direction of causality between low tax morale and being self-employed remains
an open question. In any case, this information is relevant to (tax) policy makers. Why do we
not observe a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent level of beneﬁt morale between the two groups?
The results suggest that opportunities of self-employed citizens to commit beneﬁt fraud may not
diﬀer from those of a wage earner.
8 Sensitivity analysis
We tested the sensitivity of our results to a number of alternative speciﬁcations and methods.
Firstly, we estimated a ﬁxed-eﬀects model by introducing country ﬁxed-eﬀects. Thereby, we
control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the country-level. It turns out that our
results (see Table6) are robust. We do not observe any important diﬀerences compared to results
discussed above at the individual nor at the country level. Secondly, we accounted for the ordinal
nature of the two dependent variables. In particular, we have estimated a multilevel proportional-
odds model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005). The qualitative results are equivalent to those of
the conventional multilevel model presented above (estimation results are available upon request).
Finally, one might be concerned about potential endogeneity of income. In particular, given our
ﬁnding that tax morale deteriorates with income, one could argue that this relation might be
due to reversed causality namely, that after-tax income increases if tax morale decreases. To
check for this sort of endogeneity one can employ an instrumental variable approach. Therefore,
20Again, based on social psychological considerations one could argue that citizens living in rural areas have a
stronger dependency on the reactions from others due to diﬀerent social structure in rural areas as compared to
large cities. Moreover, one would generally expect a stronger corporate attitude in rural areas.
21This observation is typically explained by the following reasons: (i) Self-employed citizens report their income
to the taxing authority, while employees typically have their employers forward the information to the tax au-
thority. The existence of an intermediary decreases the opportunities to evade taxes; (ii) The less visible income
of self-employed citizens and their more complex tax return (including deductibles) may oﬀer more opportunities
to conceal income. There is suggestive empirical evidence that citizens enter into self-employment in order to
exploit associated tax evasion opportunities (Bruce, 2000).
17a variable is needed which only aﬀects income but is not related to tax morale. We utilize a
robust empirical ﬁnding from the labor economics literature (Oi and Idson, 1999) stating that
earnings are higher in larger ﬁrms. We instrument income by the number of employees in the
tax morale equation. Controlling for other observable characteristics it is plausible that the
number of co-workers is not related to individual tax morale. One drawback of this empirical
strategy is that it applies to the employed citizens only and that the information on the number
of co-workers is available only for a subset of observations. However, given the fact that it is
usually hard to ﬁnd such a credible instrument, we accept this trade-oﬀ. Our two-stage least
square estimation procedure in Table5 supports our ﬁnding from above. Again, we ﬁnd that tax
morale deteriorates with income.
9 Summary & conclusions
Are taxes and beneﬁts two distinct options to cheat on the state? Hitherto the economic literature
seems to treat these two oﬀenses to be symmetric. We identify an important diﬀerence between
tax evasion and beneﬁt fraud. There seems to be a discrepancy in citizens’ moral attitude
towards these two oﬀenses. Our multilevel analysis shows that the moral motivation to abstain
from cheating on the state has diﬀerent determinants in the two circumstances.
Our results suggest that moral values evolve endogenously and are determined by prices (i.e.
the cost of acting morally). Citizens who have comparably more opportunities and low cost to
commit a certain oﬀense, develop the attitude that it is a minor oﬀense. This suggests that
citizens excuse or rationalize their own deviant behavior. Put diﬀerently, they self-servingly
adjust their moral values. From a policy perspective it is beneﬁcial to know which groups of
citizens view beneﬁt fraud as a minor oﬀense and which sub-population is reluctant to pay taxes.
This allows policy makers to predict how cheating behavior will evolve over time in response to
socio-demographic changes.
Moreover, we have identiﬁed country-factors which are more amenable to policy interventions.
Fiscal policy measures broadly aﬀect beneﬁt and tax morale in the same manner, although some
quantitative diﬀerences can be observed. This type of analysis provides information of how
citizens react to certain policy measures. Our ﬁndings point at a more general phenomenon
which policy makers should be aware of when attempting to increase (decrease) the demand of
goods with positive (negative) externalities. In each case they have to account for the impact of
18policy on citizens’ moral motivation. For instance, consider the topical case of the environment.
An eﬀective environmental policy is clearly in dire need of citizens’ moral motivation to behave
pro environmentally.
Finally, our results can be interpreted on the basis of the motivation crowding theory, which sug-
gests that individuals diﬀerentiate between two diﬀerent sources of motivation: incentives applied
from outside (extrinsic motivation) and their ‘inner feelings’ (intrinsic motivation). Intrinsic mo-
tivation is an endogenous dimension, and a change in the level of the extrinsic motivation may
alter the level of intrinsic motivation as well. In general, it is not clear in which way an external
intervention will aﬀect intrinsic motivation. We have shown that in the context of beneﬁt fraud
and tax evasion the intrinsic motivation to comply (beneﬁt morale and tax morale) is indeed
altered by extrinsic factors, such as tax rates.
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2310 Data appendix
Individual level responses on beneﬁt morale, tax morale, age, sex, marital status, children,
education (captured by the school leaving age), household income (measured on a ten-point
scale), size of the place of residence (measured on a three-point scale) and employment status
(employed, self-employed, unemployed and out of labor force) were taken from the European and
World Values Survey (E/WVS). In particular, we used the European and World Values Surveys
Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004. We selected all OECD-member countries for which
beneﬁt morale and tax morale is available, except South Korea. We have decided to exclude
South Korea since no information on labor market status was available. Our sample consists of
all observations from respondents from these OECD-member countries for which information on
these basic individual characteristics was available. (Table 1 shows the number of observations
over years and countries.) Note that the E/WVS includes two questions on education: (i) ‘What
is the highest educational level that you have attained?’ and (ii) ‘At what age did you (or will
you) complete your full time education?’. While the former question would be preferred to
measure the level of education, there are considerably more missing answers compared to the
latter one. In order to exploit all the available information on education and to save observations
we constructed a variable capturing the actual or the regular school leaving age. In particular,
if information on the second question was available we used it. In cases where the answer on the
second question was missing, but information on the ﬁrst question was available, we imputed
the regular school leaving age at the respective educational level. Thereby we distinguished
two cases: (i) If there was information on both questions for other respondents from the same
country and year available, we imputed the average school leaving age among those with the
same highest educational level attained. (ii) If there were no respondents from the same country
and year available with information on both questions we imputed the regular school living age
of the respective educational level. (Details are available upon request.)
The primary source for the macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP-deﬂator and
unemployment rate) are the OECD Factbook 2007 and various issues of the OECD Economic
Outlook. However, for the Czech Republic (1991), Mexico (1996), Poland (1990) and Slovakia
(1991) no information on unemployment rates was available and we retrieved this information
from the Database of the International Labour Organization. Information for Hungary (1991),
Poland (1990) and Slovakia (1991) on the GDP-deﬂator is from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators.
Data on public social expenditure are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. This
classiﬁes an expenditure item as social if the beneﬁts are intended to address one or more social
purposes, and if programmes regulating the provision involve either an inter-personal redistribu-
tion, or a compulsory participation. The OECD groups beneﬁts with a social purpose in nine
policy areas: (i) old-age (pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and residential services
for the elderly), (ii) survivors (pensions and funeral payments), (iii) incapacity-related beneﬁts
(care services, disability beneﬁts, beneﬁts accruing from occupational injury and accident legis-
lation, employee sickness payments), (iv) health (spending on in- and out-patient care, medical
goods, prevention), (v) family (child allowances and credits, child-care support, income sup-
port during leave, sole parent payments), (vi) active labor market policies (employment services,
training, youth measures, subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled), (vii)
unemployment (unemployment compensation, severance pay, early retirement for labor market
reasons), (viii) housing (housing allowances and rent subsidies) and (ix) other social policy ar-
eas (non-categorical cash beneﬁts to low-income households, other social services). For further
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Data source: E/WVS
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TM, spec. III TM, spec. IV BM, spec. III BM, spec. IV
Figure 7: Impact of increasing public social spending along the income distribution.






No. of children 0.012 (0.064)
School leaving age 0.049 (0.036)
Town size -0.001 (0.121)
Constant 9.574*** (1.193)
No. of observations 3,768
No. of countries 18
a The dependent variable is tax morale.
Method of estimation is two-stage least
squares. Income is identiﬁed by the exclusive
restriction of the number of co-workers. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** in-
dicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent
level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, re-
spectively.
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